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Synopsis. We study the joint effect of CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism on firm 
performance and value. Successful innovation involves trial and error. An overconfident CEO is more 
willing to initiate daring investment projects, but also subjects the firm to excessive risk. Accounting 
conservatism (also referred to as prudence), on the other hand, accelerates the recognition of bad news, 
giving managers additional time to search for creative solutions that could not be anticipated before 
the project was undertaken. The theory of innovation, therefore, predicts that CEO overconfidence 
and accounting conservatism are complementary, i.e., the presence of both biases improves the firm's 
performance relative to the baseline case, especially if the firm operates in a dynamic, fast-changing 
environment. 
Data and empirical design. To ensure that our data sources are reliable, we study the US-listed firms 
and use publicly available data sources (primarily the CRISP and Compustat data files). We use several 
measures of CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism that have been proposed in the literature. 
Our empirical proxies for overconfidence are based on the stock option exercise behavior (e.g., Ahmed 
and Duellman 2013), press coverage (e.g., Hribar and Yang 2014), net insider purchases of the firm's 
shares (e.g., Campbell et al. 2011), and capital investment (e.g., Schrand and Zechman 2012). We follow 
Khan and Watts (2009) to construct a firm- and year-specific measure of accounting conservatism. 
Results and discussion. Our empirical tests confirm the theoretical prediction. We report that firms 
that practice conservative accounting and are run by overconfident CEOs exhibit better performance, 
as measured by return on assets and Tobin's Q, especially following acquisitions, and lower crash risk. 
As expected, the joint positive effect of CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism on firm 
performance is stronger in high-uncertainty environments and in firms facing less stringent financing 
constraints. The study has implications for the ongoing debate on encouraging entrepreneurial activity and 
are particularly relevant to corporate entrepreneurship. The counterintuitive result is that introducing— 
e.g., by changing regulatory requirements—a conservative bias encourages firms to become more 
entrepreneurial. 
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